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Abstract We prove that the teleportation based quantum cryptography pro-
tocol presented in [Opt. Commun. 283, 184 (2010)], which is built using only
orthogonal states encoding the classical bits that are teleported from Alice
to Bob, is asymptotically secure against all types of individual and collective
attacks. We then investigate modifications to that protocol leading to greater
secret-key rates and to security against coherent attacks. In other words, we
show an unconditional secure quantum key distribution protocol that does
not need non-orthogonal quantum states to encode the bits of the secret key
sent from Alice to Bob. We also revisit the security proof of the BB84 pro-
tocol by exploring the non-uniqueness of the Schmidt decomposition of its
entanglement-based representation. This allows us to arrive at a secure trans-
mission of the key for a slightly greater quantum bit error rate (quantum
communication channel’s noise) when compared to its standard security anal-
ysis.
1 Introduction
In today’s world, where the amount of information produced, stored, and trans-
mitted has increased to an unprecedented level, it is of utmost importance the
construction of ways to store and transmit information in a secure way, where
only authorized parties are able to access the content of the stored and trans-
mitted data [1]. Cryptography is an interdisciplinary field of research whose
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main goal is the construction of devices and protocols such that the transmis-
sion of information can be made in a secure way, preventing an eavesdropper
(Eve) from deciphering the message sent from one party (Alice) to another
one (Bob).
The standard solution currently employed by Alice to cipher a message,
such that only Bob can decipher it, is based on public key protocols [2]. The
security of those protocols is based on the assumption that there is no efficient
algorithm to factor huge prime numbers. If this were the case, this algorithm
could be adapted to break the security of all public key cryptography proto-
cols. Although there is no classical algorithm that can efficiently factor prime
numbers of any size, this is not the case quantumly [3]. The proof that a quan-
tum computer can factor efficiently large prime numbers was the main trigger
that boosted the field of quantum cryptography, which had already offered an
alternative solution to secure communication [4] about 10 years before Peter
Shor’s work [3].
The protocol presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [4], later called the
BB84 protocol, was the quantum solution to the key distribution problem. The
key distribution problem is basically the classical impossibility to be 100% sure
that only two parties, and no one else, agree on a random sequence of bits that
is sent from one party to another. The transmission of the key from Alice to
Bob via classical means can in principle be monitored by a clever and powerful
enough Eve, who copies the random bits during their transmission without ever
being detected by Alice and Bob. This is the scenario dictated by classical
physics, in which copying or cloning of bits is always possible. However, if we
use non-orthogonal quantum states to encode the bits to be transmitted from
Alice to Bob, and if we believe in the correctness of quantum mechanics, no
eavesdropper can tamper with the quantum key distribution without being
discovered by Alice and Bob [4]. The quantum solution to the key distribution
problem brought back to the table classical private key protocols, the one-time
pad for example [1], which can now be made secure if the key distribution
needed to its implementation is made quantumly using the BB84 protocol.
Moreover, private key protocols, once a secure key is established between Alice
and Bob, will not become insecure with the advent of a quantum computer.
This is the main reason that led to the boom of research and development in
the field of quantum cryptography in the last two decades [5,6,7], culminating
with commercially viable quantum cryptography solutions [8,9,10].
The most important concept behind all standard quantum key distribution
schemes is the use of non-orthogonal quantum states to encode the classical
bits 0 and 1 [11]. Those bits are randomly generated by Alice and randomly
encoded into non-orthogonal quantum states (qubits) that are sent to Bob.
By properly preparing and measuring those qubits, Alice and Bob are able
to share a secret random string of 0’s and 1’s, i.e., the secret key needed to
the implementation of private key cryptography protocols.1 And since non-
1 Alice and Bob must also share an authenticated classical channel, which can be totally
insecure, to realize the key distribution.
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orthogonal quantum states cannot be cloned [12,13], the transmission of a
random sequence of bits using this strategy is secure according to the laws of
quantum mechanics.
What happens if the qubits encoding the bits of the secret key are not
physically sent but rather teleported from Alice to Bob [14]? On the one hand
we can think of this process as a substitution to the direct sending of the qubits
from Alice to Bob through a physical channel. In this case, the teleportation of
qubits is an alternative way to send to Bob the quantum information contained
in those qubits, playing no direct role in the generation of the secret key. Also,
no qualitative changes are made to the quantum key distribution protocols
when we use the quantum teleportation protocol either as a substitute to the
direct transmission of the qubits or to increase the physical distance between
Alice and Bob in which they can still establish a secret key [15].
On the other hand, we can use the quantum teleportation protocol as the
main ingredient to the construction of a quantum key distribution protocol,
such that the teleportation protocol plays an active role in the generation of
the key. This active role of the teleportation protocol in the generation of the
key is the main feature of the quantum key distribution protocol originally pre-
sented in Ref. [16], from now on called the GR10 protocol. In addition to that,
the GR10 protocol has two other interesting features. First, it works securely
even when Alice and Bob use partially entangled states to implement the quan-
tum teleportation protocol [17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25]. Second, the classical
bits of the secret key can be encoded into two orthogonal states that are sub-
sequently teleported from Alice to Bob. This last feature is in contrast to
standard quantum key distribution schemes, where the use of non-orthogonal
quantum states to encode the classical bits of the key is mandatory.2 See Refs.
[28,29,30] for other quantum key distribution schemes where only orthogonal
states are used in its execution.
Although so far no security loophole was found in the GR10 protocol, its
complete security analysis is lacking. One of the main goals of this work is to
fill this gap, proving that the GR10 protocol as originally conceived is secure
against all types of individual and collective attacks. This is a new contribution
of this work whose details are shown in Sec. 3, where we also review how the
GR10 protocol works and give the main qualitative reasons of why it is indeed
secure. Another new contribution in this work is a discussion on how the
GR10 protocol can be modified in order to achieve asymptotic unconditional
security, i.e., security against all types of attacks allowed by the laws of Physics.
But before tackling the security analysis of the GR10 protocol, we revisit in
greater detail the security analysis of the BB84 protocol in Sec. 2, presenting
the main tools needed to handle the security analysis of the GR10 protocol.
We also show that by using the non-uniqueness of the Schmidt decomposition,
we can write the purification of the BB84 protocol in such a way that it is
possible to prove its security for quantum bit error rates that are higher than
2 We can also use maximally entangled states to create a secret key shared by Alice and
Bob without using teleportation and without sending qubits encoding classical bits from
Alice to Bob [26,27].
4 Diogo Lima, Gustavo Rigolin
those predicted by its standard security analysis. This last result, presented in
Sec. 2.5, is new and it adds in our understanding of the secure functioning of
the BB84 protocol. The last new result of this work is given in Sec. 4, where
we modify the original GR10 protocol, transforming it into a deterministic
protocol at the cost of a lower secret-key rate. And finally, in Sec. 5, we give
our concluding remarks.
2 Revisiting the security analysis of the BB84 protocol
2.1 The BB84 protocol
Before we revisit the security analysis of the BB84 protocol [31,32], we give a
short description of how it basically works. It goes as follows:
(i) In the first place, Alice and Bob agreed beforehand that the encoding of
the classical bits sent from Alice to Bob is randomly done using two non-
orthogonal quantum states for each bit. For instance, the bit 0 is either
encoded into the qubit |0〉 or |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and the bit 1 into |1〉 or
|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2.
(ii) After such agreement, Alice randomly prepares her qubit in one of the
four states described above and send it to Bob. After receiving the qubit,
Bob measures it randomly using either the z-basis, spanned by the states
{|0〉, |1〉}, or the x-basis, spanned by {|+〉, |−〉}. Whenever Bob measure-
ment results are |0〉 or |+〉, he assumes Alice sent the bit 0, while whenever
his measurement results are |1〉 or |−〉, he assigns the bit value 1. Step (ii)
is repeated N times.
(iii) After Bob has finished all his measurements on the N qubits, Alice and
Bob start a conversation over an authenticated public classical channel that
can be fully insecure. In this step Alice reveals the basis used to prepare
the qubits encoding each bit sent to Bob and he reveals the basis he used
to implement his measurements. They discard the cases where different
bases were used and keep the instances in which they used the same basis.
Roughly N/2 cases are discarded and N/2 are kept. Those N/2 remaining
shared bits are usually called the raw key and this process of selecting
the useful part of the shared bits from what is not useful is called sifting.
Note that the sifting step is crucial. According to the laws of quantum
mechanics, and if there is no noise or eavesdropping, Alice and Bob will
agree 100% of the time on the value of a given bit whenever Bob measures
his qubit in the same basis used by Alice to prepare it. Had they insisted
on keeping the cases where different bases were employed, even in principle
they could not always agree on the values of the bits, making a mistake
50% of the time.
(iv) Alice and Bob then reveal a part of the bits of their raw key, a random
sample of the N/2 remaining cases. This sample of bits is used to check
for the presence of an eavesdropper and it usually consists of N/4 bits,
half the size of the raw key [4]. If for every pair of bits in the disclosed
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sample Alice’s and Bob’s bits are the same, Alice and Bob assume no
eavesdropping happened and the remaining N/4 bits are used as a secret
key. If, as is always the case in practice, some of the bits disclosed by Alice
and Bob are not the same, they use the disclosed information to estimate
the error rate of the quantum communication channel. This error rate is
always assumed to be caused by Eve’s action, whether or not she really
acted on the channel. Below a certain threshold for the error rate, Alice and
Bob act classically on the remaining undisclosed bits implementing error
correction and privacy amplification protocols. At the end, they share a
reduced sequence of bits that can be considered secure and identical.
2.2 Unconditional security
One of the main problems of both classical and quantum cryptography is to
provide a rigorous way to compute the error rate threshold below which a key
distribution scheme is secure [5,6,7]. Specifically, we would like to have an
upper bound on the error rate below which unconditional security is achieved,
i.e., we want to know the error rate below which the key distribution protocol is
secure against any possible attack that Eve might implement using the known
laws of Physics.
The most general and powerful security attack on a quantum key distri-
bution scheme is usually called a coherent attack. Using this terminology, the
ultimate goal of quantum cryptography security analysis is thus to obtain the
tightest upper bound on the error rate below which a given quantum key
distribution protocol is secure against all coherent attacks.
To understand what a coherent attack is, it is important to discuss two
other types of attacks [5,6,7]. The first one is called individual or incoherent
attack, the least severe class of attacks. Individual attacks are such that Eve
attacks each one of the N qubits traveling from Alice to Bob independently
of the other qubits and always using the same strategy of attack.3 It is also
assumed that Eve implements all her measurements on the probes (ancillas)
she used to interact with the qubits sent by Alice before Alice and Bob start
the classical post-processing of the data (error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation).
The second type of attack, called collective attack, extends the possibili-
ties of Eve in the sense that now she can do everything allowed by individual
attacks and, in addition, she can decide to postpone the measurements on her
ancillas until the moment she considers more convenient, storing the ancillas
before any measurement in a quantum memory, for example. Also, her mea-
surements can be joint measurements (collective measurements), in which she
measures more than one ancilla simultaneously.
3 If Eve uses different strategies, Alice and Bob can detect Eve by randomly choosing
different samples of the raw key to check for security. This will lead to different error rates
for different samples if Eve uses different attacks. Thus, different error rates mean that Eve
tampered with the key distribution scheme. In this case Alice and Bob discard all the data
and restart the key distribution protocol all over.
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The coherent attack, the most powerful attack, is such that Eve can do
everything allowed by individual and collective attacks, as well as implement
any type of interaction (unitary operation) involving any number of her ancillas
with any number of the qubits sent by Alice to Bob. Eve is also allowed to
implement whatever type of measurements she likes at whatever time she
believes is more convenient to her. In summary, Eve can do with the qubits
sent from Alice to Bob whatever is allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
Here and in the rest of this work we restrict ourselves to one-way post-
processing of the raw key. In the BB84 protocol, this is implemented in the
step (iv) described above. One-way post-processing is optimally divided into
an error correction (information reconciliation) first step and then a privacy
amplification step [6]. These are classical processing protocols applied to the
raw key and they are called one-way whenever only one party sends classi-
cal information during the implementation of those tasks. The other party
acts according to previously established rules but never sends any feedback
to the communicating party. Furthermore, if the communicating party is the
one that sends the quantum states, we have direct reconciliation one-way post-
processing. Using our terminology, Alice is the party who communicates classi-
cally with Bob during the post-processing stage and he is the one acting on his
data without giving any feedback to Alice. If the size (number of bits) of the
raw key is R, at the end of the classical post-processing step only a fraction r
of the original raw key will be secure and perfectly correlated. In other words,
the shared secret key’s size is K = rR.
An important tool in the analysis of the security of a quantum key distri-
bution scheme under collective attacks, one-way classical post-processing, and
direct reconciliation is the Devetak-Winter bound [33],
r = I(A : B)−max
Eve
χ(A : E). (1)
Here r is the secret-key fraction as defined above and understood in the asymp-
totic case, namely, we are dealing with infinitely long raw keys (N → ∞) [6].
The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (1), I(A : B), is the mutual in-
formation between the classical data with Alice and Bob, i.e., the correlation
between the string of bits with Alice and the string of bits with Bob after the
sifting step. In an ideal scenario, with no noise and no Eve, r = I(A : B) = 1.
This means that every single bit of Alice’s bit string is identical with the cor-
responding one of Bob’s bit string, i.e., the raw key is the secret shared key
(K = R). The second term on the right hand side, χ(A : E), is the Holevo
quantity [34]. It can be seen as a quantum generalization of the mutual infor-
mation, quantifying Eve’s information about the raw key. Maximizing it over
all possible collective attacks, that is what the notation maxEve is telling us
to do, we can get the secret-key rate of a quantum key distribution protocol
by subtracting it from the mutual information of Alice and Bob. If r > 0, the
protocol is secure, and if r ≤ 0, it is insecure [33]. We will come back to a
more detailed discussion about I(A : B) and χ(A : E) later.
The subsequent understanding that a prepare-and-measure quantum key
distribution protocol has an equivalent entanglement-based representation [5,
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6,7,27,35] led to practical ways to compute the secret-key fraction given by
Eq. (1). Working directly with the entanglement-based version of the key dis-
tribution protocol, we can write the quantum state shared by Alice, Bob, and
Eve after the interference of Eve as a pure state (purification of the state
with Alice and Bob). This is the best scenario for Eve [33] and using the
purification we can estimate a lower bound for the secret-key rate r that de-
pends on the error rates of the protocol [6,33]. Note that the mapping of a
prepare-and-measure protocol to its entanglement-based representation does
not imply that the latter is equivalently easy to implement in practice as the
former. This mapping just tells us that the security proof obtained for the
entanglement-based protocol is as good as if we had worked directly with the
prepare-and-measure protocol [5,6,7].
The next breakthrough in the security analysis of quantum key distribu-
tion protocols, generalizing the ideas given in Refs. [36,37], was the proof that
unconditional security analysis can be carried out in the asymptotic regime
by studying the security of a given protocol at the collective attack level [38,
39]. With the help of the quantum de Finetti theorem, Renner [38], for dis-
crete variable protocols, and Renner and Cirac [39], for continuous variable
ones, showed in what sense collective and coherent attack security analysis are
equivalent.
For a permutation invariant quantum key distribution protocol, the quan-
tum de Finetti theorem guarantees that in the asymptotic limit Eve’s knowl-
edge of the raw key, when she implements a coherent attack, is not crucially
different from her knowledge of it if she had implemented a collective attack. In
other words, security under collective attacks implies security under coherent
attacks for any protocol whose entanglement-based representation is invariant
under any permutation between the quantum states describing the N pairs of
particles shared by Alice and Bob. And if this permutation invariance is not
already present due to the symmetry of the protocol, it can be enforced at a
later stage by a suitable randomization of the classical data shared by Alice
and Bob [6,7,38,39].
2.3 Mutual information and the Holevo quantity
Before we continue, it is important at this stage to give precise definitions
of the mutual information [5,6,7,40] and of the Holevo quantity [5,6,7,34,
40]. These two quantities are the main ingredients we need to compute the
secret-key fraction, Eq. (1), and thus assess the security of any quantum key
distribution protocol.
2.3.1 Mutual information
Let A denote a random variable, a its possible outcomes, and pA(a) the prob-
ability of A having the value a. The Shannon entropy H(A) associated with
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the random variable A is [40]
H(A) = −
∑
a
pA(a) log[pA(a)], (2)
where the base of the logarithm is 2 and 0 log 0 = 0. The Shannon entropy
quantifies the information content of the random variable A. For a completely
random variable whose sample space is composed of n symbols, we have that
pA(a) = 1/n, any a. This leads to H(A) attaining its maximum value possible:
logn. For the trivial case where only one pA(a) = 1 and all the others are zero,
we get H(A) = 0, the least amount of information possible. For any other
random distribution of n symbols, 0 ≤ H(A) ≤ logn.
If we now similarly introduce another random variable B, the probability
of finding B with the value b given that A has the value a is pB|A(b|a). This
is usually called the conditional probability. With the aid of the conditional
probability we can define the conditional entropy as
H(B|A) =
∑
a
pA(a)H(B|A = a), (3)
where
H(B|A = a) = −
∑
b
pB|A(b|a) log[pB|A(b|a)]. (4)
The conditional entropy quantifies the average information contained on the
several conditional “random variables B|A” that can be built for each out-
come a of the random variable A. In a certain sense, it measures the average
information needed to completely characterize the random variable B given
our knowledge of A. If A and B are perfectly correlated, i.e, if the knowledge
of A completely determines B, we have that H(B|A) = 0. On the other hand,
for completely independent variables A and B, H(B|A) = H(B).
Using the Shannon and the conditional entropies, the mutual information
between the two random variables A and B reads,
I(A : B) = H(B)−H(B|A). (5)
The mutual information quantifies the correlation between the random vari-
ables A and B and it is related to the statistical mutual dependence be-
tween these two random variables. For completely independent random vari-
ables A and B, the mutual information acquires its minimal value possible,
I(A : B) = 0, since H(B|A) = H(B). For perfectly correlated variables
H(B|A) = 0 and we thus get I(A : B) = H(B).
2.3.2 The Holevo quantity
Let us assume that for each one of the possible outcomes a of a random
variable A we associate the quantum state ρE|a. We can think of ρE|a as the
quantum state with Eve conditioned on Alice’s obtaining the state |a〉 after
she implements, for instance, a projective measurement on her system. The
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probability pA(a) of getting the value a from A is such that it is equal to
Alice’s chance of getting after her measurement the state |a〉. In this scenario,
the density matrix describing Eve’s system is given by an ensemble built on
the states ρE|a with probability weight pA(a),
ρE =
∑
a
pA(a)ρE|a. (6)
The state ρE can also be seen as Eve’s description of her system if she knows
nothing about the measurement results obtained by Alice at a given run of a
quantum key distribution protocol. This is the case in the BB84 and GR10
protocols, where the key is built out of the instances in which no information
is revealed about Alice’s measurement results. Only the measurement basis is
publicly revealed, which means that Eve has no information about which state
|a〉 Alice measured.
The state ρE is obtained by tracing out Alice’s system from the state below,
which describes Alice and Eve’s joint state prior to any measurement,
ρE = TrA(ρAE). (7)
Using ρAE and the measurement postulate of quantum mechanics, if Alice
projects her state onto |a〉〈a| we have that
pA(a) = Tr[ρAE(|a〉〈a| ⊗ 1E)], (8)
where we now take the total trace and 1E is the identity operator acting on
Eve’s Hilbert space. The measurement postulate also implies that
ρE|a = (〈a| ⊗ 1E)ρAE(|a〉 ⊗ 1E)/pA(a). (9)
The state ρAE is, in its turn, obtained from the partial trace with respect
to Bob of ρABE , the total state describing Alice, Bob, and Eve,
ρAE = TrB(ρABE). (10)
Using the previous notation, the Holevo quantity is given by
χ(A : E) = S(ρE)−
∑
a
pA(a)S(ρE|a), (11)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ [40],
S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ). (12)
We can appreciate the meaning of the Holevo quantity χ(A : E) noting
that it bounds the communication capacity of a quantum channel, where we
encoded the classical symbols a, whose probability of occurrence is pA(a),
into the quantum states ρE|a [6,33,34]. Because of this property, the Holevo
quantity is usually considered a quantum extension of the mutual information.
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2.4 Entanglement-based representation of the BB84 protocol and its
standard security analysis
The entanglement-based representation of the BB84 protocol is [6]
|Φ1〉 = |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). (13)
This is one of the four Bell states and it reproduces exactly the statistics
Alice and Bob obtain in the original prepare and measure scheme [4]. Indeed,
if Alice and Bob measure their qubits in the z-basis, they will obtain with
equal chances either the qubit |0〉 or the qubit |1〉. Also, noting that |Φ+〉 =
(|++〉+ |−−〉)/√2, a similar perfect correlation follows if they both measure
their qubits in the x-basis.
The Bell state |Φ+〉 together with the other three,
|Φ2〉 = |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉), (14)
|Φ3〉 = |Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), (15)
|Φ4〉 = |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), (16)
form a complete orthonormal basis that can be used to expand any pure two-
qubit state.
In the ideal scenario, after each run of the entanglement-based version of
the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob share the state |Φ+〉. After N runs they
share the state |Φ+〉⊗N . However, in the presence of Eve and at the collective
attack level, Eve attacks each one of the qubits traveling to Bob individually
and using the same strategy.4 This means that the state shared by Alice, Bob,
and Eve after N runs of the protocol can be written as
|Ψ〉⊗NABE = |Ψ〉ABE ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Ψ〉ABE , (17)
where
|Ψ〉ABE =
4∑
j=1
√
λj |Φj〉AB|ǫj〉E . (18)
Equation (18) is a purification of the state describing Alice, Bob, and Eve
and we can always use it to describe the global state of our parties due to
the Schmidt decomposition theorem [40]. For a large enough Hilbert space
describing Eve’s states, we can always write |Ψ〉ABE as given above, with all
λj non negative,
∑
j λj = 1, and |ǫj〉 forming an orthonormal basis.
Since after N runs of the protocol the global state shared by all parties
is |Ψ〉⊗NABE , we have an ensemble of N replicas of the state |Ψ〉ABE . Thus, all
4 Although we will be dealing with collective attacks, the following analysis remains valid
for the more general class of coherent attacks due to the results of Refs. [36,37,38,39].
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correlation between AB (Alice and Bob) and E (Eve) can be analyzed working
directly with |Ψ〉ABE . Also, note that without Eve or noise we have λ1 = 1
and λj = 0, j = 2, 3, 4. When Eve is present, however, we have in general that
λj 6= 0, for all j.
Using Eq. (18) we are able to determine in which way the presence of Eve
affects the BB84 protocol or, equivalently, we can study how the presence of
noise changes the operation of the BB84 protocol from its expected noiseless
case. When Eve is present and Alice and Bob use the same basis to prepare
and measure their qubits, the probability of agreement on the value of the bit
sent from Alice is no longer one.
Considering the instances in which Alice and Bob employed the z-basis,
the probability of agreement on the value of the bit sent from Alice to Bob is
1−εz = pA(0)pB|A(0|0)+pA(1)pB|A(1|1), while the probability of Bob making
a mistake is εz = pA(0)pB|A(1|0)+pA(1)pB|A(0|1). However, a standard result
from the theory of probabilities states that pAB(a, b) = pA(a)pB|A(b|a), where
pAB(a, b) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob seeing simultaneously the
values a and b, respectively. This leads to
εz = pAB(0, 1) + pAB(1, 0) (19)
and to a similar expression for 1− εz.
Applying the measurement postulate of quantum mechanics we get
pAB(a, b) = Tr(PabρABE), (20)
where
ρABE = (|Ψ〉ABE)(ABE〈Ψ |), (21)
with |Ψ〉ABE given by Eq. (18), and
Pab = |a〉A A〈a| ⊗ |b〉B B〈b| ⊗ 1E . (22)
Inserting Eqs. (21) and (22) into (20) we obtain
pAB(0, 1) = pAB(1, 0) = (λ3 + λ4)/2 (23)
and consequently
εz = λ3 + λ4. (24)
If we now consider the cases where Alice and Bob employed the x-basis to
prepare and measure their qubits, a similar calculation leads to the following
probability of Bob making a mistake on the value of the bit sent by Alice,
εx = λ2 + λ4. (25)
We are now ready to compute the two quantities needed to calculate the
secret-key fraction of the BB84 protocol (see Eq. (1)). We begin with the
mutual information and then we move on to the Holevo quantity.
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2.4.1 The mutual information of the BB84 protocol
In order to compute the mutual information between Alice and Bob, we con-
sider the cases in which they have employed the z-basis to prepare and measure
their qubits. The cases in which they both use the x-basis will only be employed
to estimate the error εx needed to the computation of the Holevo quantity [6].
Due to the symmetry of the state ρAB = TrE(ρABE) under the permutation
of the qubit with Alice with the one with Bob, we have that pA(a) = pB(a).
Thus, inserting Eqs. (21) and (10) into (8) we get
pA(0) = pA(1) = pB(0) = pB(1) = 1/2. (26)
Using Eq. (26), it is not difficult to see that Eq. (2) becomes
H(A) = H(B) = 1. (27)
Now, using that pAB(a, b) = pA(a)pB|A(b|a) and that
∑
b pAB(a, b) =
pA(a), it is possible to compute Eq. (3) with the aid of Eqs. (23) and (26).
This leads to
H(B|A) = h(εz), (28)
with
h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) (29)
being the binary entropy, and where we have used that pAB(0, 0) = pAB(1, 1) =
(λ1 + λ2)/2 to write Eq. (28) as shown above.
Combining Eqs. (27) and (28) we finally get the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob (see Eq. (5)),
I(A : B) = 1− h(εz). (30)
2.4.2 The Holevo quantity of the BB84 protocol
Looking at Eq. (11), we see that to compute the Holevo quantity we need
ρE = TrAB(ρABE), Eve’s quantum state after she interacts her probes with
the qubit sent by Alice, and ρE|a, Eve’s description of her physical system if
she knows that Alice projected her qubit onto the state |a〉.
Tracing out Alice and Bob from ρABE , Eq. (21), we get
ρE =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE〈ǫj |, (31)
which, after inserted into Eq. (12), gives
S(ρE) = −
4∑
j=1
λj logλj . (32)
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Furthermore, a direct calculation using Eqs. (9), (10), (21), and (26) leads
to
ρE|0 =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj |+
√
λ1λ2 (|ǫ1〉EE〈ǫ2|+ h.c.)
+
√
λ3λ4 (|ǫ3〉EE 〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) , (33)
ρE|1 =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj | −
√
λ1λ2 (|ǫ1〉EE〈ǫ2|+ h.c.)
−
√
λ3λ4 (|ǫ3〉EE 〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) , (34)
where h.c. denotes the Hermitian conjugate of the operator appearing before
it. Noting that the eigenvalues of both ρE|0 and ρE|1 are 0, 0, λ1 + λ2, and
λ3 + λ4, the von Neumann entropy, Eq. (12), for those states becomes
S(ρE|0) = S(ρE|1) = h(εz), (35)
where we have used Eq. (24) to eliminate the λ’s in favor of the error rate εz.
Inserting Eqs. (32) and (35) into (11), and using that pA(a) = 1/2, the
Holevo quantity reads
χ(A : E) = −
4∑
j=1
λj logλj − h(εz). (36)
2.4.3 The secret-key fraction of the BB84 protocol
If we insert Eqs. (30) and (36) into (1), we get the following expression for the
secret-key fraction of the BB84 protocol,
r = 1− h(εz)−max
Eve
−
4∑
j=1
λj logλj − h(εz)

= 1− h(εz) + h(εz)−max
Eve
−
4∑
j=1
λj logλj

= 1 +min
Eve

4∑
j=1
λj logλj
 . (37)
Note that to arrive at the last equality we used that
−max
x
[f(x)] = min
x
[−f(x)],
i.e., the negative of the maximum value of a function f over its domain is equal
to the minimum of −f over the same domain.
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For the original BB84 protocol, we have shown that the λ’s satisfy the
following three equations,
λ3 + λ4 = εz, (38)
λ2 + λ4 = εx, (39)
4∑
i=1
λi = 1. (40)
Since we have four λ’s, we cannot uniquely express them in terms of the
experimentally determined error rates εz and εx. This means that we will
need to minimize the expression inside the curly brackets in Eq. (37) in order
to get a lower bound of the secret-key fraction as a function of those error
rates. This is most easily done following the prescription given in Ref. [6].
Using Eq. (38) we see that λ4 = εz − λ3 and thus that 0 ≤ λ3 ≤ εz since
no λj can be negative. This means that we can write
λ3 = vεz, (41)
λ4 = (1− v)εz, (42)
where v ∈ [0, 1].
Now, Eq. (40) can be written as λ2 = 1−λ1−λ3−λ4 = (1−εz)−λ1, where
we used Eq. (38) to arrive at the last equality. Since λ2 cannot be negative we
have 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1− εz and, as before, we can write
λ1 = u(1− εz), (43)
λ2 = (1− u)(1− εz), (44)
with u ∈ [0, 1].
The parameters u and v are not independent since Eq. (39) implies that
(1− u)(1− εz) + (1− v)εz = εx. Solving for u we get
u = (1− εx − vεz)/(1− εz), (45)
leaving us with only v as a free parameter. Inserting Eq. (45) into (41) and
(42) and using Eqs. (41)-(43), we can write the secret-key fraction (37) as
r = 1 +min
Eve
{θ (1− εx − εzv) + θ (εx − εz(1− v)) + θ(εz − εzv) + θ(εzv)} ,
(46)
where
θ(x) = x log x. (47)
Minimizing r as a function of v, i.e., solving dr/dv = 0 gives
v = 1− εx, (48)
which is indeed a minimum for r since a direct calculation leads to d2r/dv2 > 0
when v = 1− εx.
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Using Eqs. (45) and (48) we can express the λ’s giving the lower bound for
the secret-key fraction as
λ1 = (1 − εx)(1 − εz), (49)
λ2 = εx(1− εz), (50)
λ3 = εz(1 − εx), (51)
λ4 = εzεx. (52)
Inserting Eqs.(49)-(52) into (37) we obtain the lower bound for the secret-key
fraction of the BB84 protocol in terms of the measurable quantities εz and εx,
r = 1− h(εx)− h(εz). (53)
The quantities εx and εz are the probability of Bob making a mistake (error
rate) about the value of a bit sent by Alice when they both use the same basis,
either the x- or z-basis, to prepare and measure the qubit encoding that bit.
If we assume that εx = εz = ε, the secret-key fraction can be written as
r = 1− 2h(ε), (54)
where it is not difficult to see that r > 0 whenever
ε . 11%. (55)
In other words, for symmetrical error rates below 11% the BB84 protocol can
be considered secure [6].
2.5 Non-uniqueness of the Schmidt decomposition and the security of the
BB84 protocol
Instead of Eq. (18), a perfectly legitimate Schmidt decomposition representing
the state of Alice, Bob, and Eve is
|Ψ˜〉ABE =
4∑
j=1
√
λ˜j |Φ˜j〉AB|ǫ˜j〉E , (56)
where
|Φ˜1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), (57)
|Φ˜2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉), (58)
|Φ˜3〉 = |01〉, (59)
|Φ˜4〉 = |10〉, (60)
span a complete orthonormal basis that can be used to describe any two-qubit
pure state. Note that |Φ˜1〉 = |Φ1〉 and |Φ˜2〉 = |Φ2〉, where |Φ1〉 and |Φ2〉 are
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given by Eqs. (13) and (14). Moreover, when Eve is absent λ˜1 = 1, with the
other λ˜’s being zero, recovering the entanglement-based representation of the
BB84 protocol in the ideal scenario.
Equation (56) is another purification describing the state of Alice, Bob,
and Eve after Eve has coupled her ancillas with the qubit sent from Alice to
Bob. The same arguments that led us to write Eq. (18) apply here and, as
before, 0 ≤ λ˜j ≤ 1,
∑
j λ˜j = 1, and |ǫ˜j〉, j = 1, . . . , 4, span an orthonormal
basis.
The purifications (18) and (56) are connected by the following relation
|Ψ˜〉ABE = (UAB ⊗ UE)|Ψ〉ABE , (61)
where
UAB =
2∑
j=1
|Φj〉ABAB〈Φj |+|01〉ABAB〈Φ3|+|10〉ABAB〈Φ4|, (62)
UE =
4∑
j=1
|ǫ˜j〉E E〈ǫj | . (63)
It is worth mentioning that the unitary operation connecting the two purifi-
cations is local with respect to the partition AB and E.
Since this unitary operation is local with respect to Eve, we can alterna-
tively go from (18) to (56) by identifying |ǫ˜j〉 with |ǫj〉, λ˜j with λj , and by
simply applying the following unitary operation,
UAB ⊗ 1E , (64)
where 1E is the identity operator acting on Eve’s Hilbert space. Since Eve’s
unitary operation is given by the identity operator, it is clear that no changes
are made on the states describing her system. Also, whether we think of
|Ψ˜〉ABE as given by UAB ⊗ UE|Ψ〉ABE or by UAB ⊗ 1E |Ψ〉ABE , we will get
the same lower bound for the secret-key fraction since we need to compute
the Holevo quantity maximizing it over all possible strategies that Eve might
employ. As such, and in order to simplify notation, we will write |ǫj〉 and λj
instead of |ǫ˜j〉 and λ˜j .
However, the purification (56) is not equivalent to (18) in the following
sense. As we will show below, the way we write the purification (56) forces
us to introduce another constraint among the λ’s that is absent from (18).
This will allow us to get a tighter lower bound for the secret-key fraction,
which ultimately leads to an increase of the error rates below which the BB84
protocol continues to operate securely.
Let us now present this extra constraint. If we repeat the steps that led to
Eq. (26) using Eq. (56) instead of (18) we get,
pA(0) = (λ1 + λ2)/2 + λ3, (65)
pA(1) = (λ1 + λ2)/2 + λ4. (66)
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But whether or not Eve interferes, the BB84 protocol is such that we always
have
pA(0) = pA(1) = 1/2, (67)
since Alice randomly chooses with equal chances whether she sends Bob the
bit 0 or 1. Enforcing the condition (67) onto Eqs. (65) and (66), we see that
we must have
λ3 = λ4 = λ. (68)
Using the constraint (68) it is not difficult to see that a direct calculation,
similar to what we did in Sec. 2.4, leads to
pA(0) = pA(1) = pB(0) = pB(1) = 1/2 (69)
and to
pAB(0, 0) = pAB(1, 1) = (λ1 + λ2)/2, (70)
pAB(0, 1) = pAB(1, 0) = λ. (71)
Similarly, we also obtain for the mutual information between Alice and
Bob,
I(A : B) = 1− h(εz), (72)
where
εz = 2λ, (73)
εx = λ2 + λ. (74)
We now move on to the calculation of the Holevo quantity, Eq. (11), using
the new purification (56). Using Eq. (56) and the constraint (68) we get
ρE = TrAB(ρABE) =
2∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE〈ǫj|+ λ(|ǫ3〉EE〈ǫ3|+ |ǫ4〉E E〈ǫ4|)
and thus
S(ρE) = −λ1 logλ1 − λ2 logλ2 − 2λ logλ. (75)
Now, employing Eq. (56) instead of (18) we get after Eqs. (9), (10), (21),
and (26),
ρE|0 = λ1 |ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ1|+ λ2 |ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ2|+ 2λ |ǫ3〉EE〈ǫ3|
+
√
λ1λ2 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ2|+ h.c.) , (76)
ρE|1 = λ1 |ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ1|+ λ2 |ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ2|+ 2λ |ǫ4〉EE〈ǫ4|
−
√
λ1λ2 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ2|+ h.c.) . (77)
The eigenvalues of both ρE|0 and ρE|1 are 0, 0, λ1 +λ2, and 2λ, leading to the
following value for the von Neumann entropy,
S(ρE|0) = S(ρE|1) = h(εz), (78)
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after using Eq. (73).
The Holevo quantity is obtained when we insert Eqs. (69), (75), and (78)
into (11), giving
χ(A : E) = −λ1 logλ1 − λ2 logλ2 − 2λ logλ− h(εz). (79)
Finally, the secret-key fraction, Eq. (1), comes from subtracting Eq. (79) from
(72),
r = 1 + λ1 logλ1 + λ2 logλ2 + 2λ logλ. (80)
It is worth mentioning that we do not need this time to minimize r over
all strategies that Eve might employ because all quantities are already fixed
by the experimental data, i.e., all we need to compute r is εx and εz. This
comes about due to the extra constraint, Eq. (68), which allows us to uniquely
determine the λ’s as functions of the error rates εx and εz. Using Eqs. (73),
(74), and the normalization condition of the λ’s, namely, λ1+λ2+2λ = 1, we
have
λ1 = 1− εx − εz/2, (81)
λ2 = εx − εz/2, (82)
λ = εz/2. (83)
The secret-key fraction is obtained inserting Eqs. (81)-(83) into (80), which
can be written after some algebra as follows,
r = εz log εz+(1−εx−εz/2) log(2−2εx−εz)+(εx−εz/2) log(2εx−εz). (84)
Assuming, as before, we deal with a depolarizing channel (εx = εz = ε)
the secret-key fraction becomes
r = (3ε/2) log ε+ (1 − 3ε/2) log(2 − 3ε). (85)
Searching for the maximal ε giving r > 0 we get
ε . 12.61%. (86)
The above error rate threshold is the same one obtains working with the six-
state protocol [6,41,42,43,32], where in addition to the z- and x-basis we have
the bits encoded in the y-basis. This means that both the BB84 and the six-
state protocols are secure under the same level of noise. It is worth stressing
once more that we could only achieve the previous result due to the exploration
of the non-uniqueness of the purification (Schmidt decomposition) describing
the state of Alice, Bob, and Eve.
We also point out that we have carried out the security analysis for the
BB84 protocol using the Schmidt decomposition (56) without imposing the
constraint (68). In this case we had to minimize r over all possible strategies
of Eve because there still remained a free λ in the expression for r. At the end
of the minimization process we found out that the constraint (68) naturally
emerged as the scenario that is best to Eve. Since the constraint (68) is related
to the fact that pA(0) = pA(1) = 1/2, it is possible that a non-symmetrical
protocol, such that pA(0) 6= pA(1), may lead to an increase in the level of noise
in which it still operates securely.
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3 Asymptotic security analysis of the GR10 protocol
To better appreciate all the steps involved in the operation of the GR10 pro-
tocol [16] and to get a qualitative feeling of why it is secure, it is crucial to
understand how the probabilistic teleportation protocol works [17,18,19,22,
23]. A brief review of the probabilistic teleportation protocol, gauged to the
purposes of this work, is the subject of Sec. 3.1. In Sec. 3.2 we present the
GR10 protocol using the notation employed in this work. In Sec. 3.3 we start
by highlighting the main qualitative features of the GR10 protocol that makes
it secure against an eavesdropper attack and then we provide its full and rig-
orous security analysis, similar in spirit to the ones previously shown for the
BB84 protocol.
3.1 The probabilistic teleportation protocol
Alice’s goal is to teleport to Bob the state
|φ〉A = α|0〉A + β|1〉A (87)
through the following entangled state shared with him,
|Φn1 〉AB =
|00〉AB + n|11〉AB√
1 + n2
. (88)
Here α, β are complex numbers, |α|2+ |β|2 = 1 is the normalization condition,
and 0 ≤ n ≤ 1. Note that Eq. (88) is not a maximally entangled state whenever
n < 1. Equation (88) together with the generalized Bell states [17,18,19]
|Φn2 〉 =
n|00〉 − |11〉√
1 + n2
, (89)
|Φn3 〉 =
|01〉+ n|10〉√
1 + n2
, (90)
|Φn4 〉 =
n|01〉 − |10〉√
1 + n2
, (91)
form a complete set of orthonormal vectors spanning a two-qubit Hilbert space.
All the steps of the probabilistic teleportation protocol are similar to the
deterministic one [14]. The two differences are related to the use of a non-
maximally entangled state connecting Alice and Bob, |Φn1 〉AB , and to the basis
onto which Alice’s projects her qubits. Instead of projecting her qubits onto
maximally entangled Bell states (n = 1), she projects them onto generalized
Bell states |Φmj 〉AA, where we assume for the moment that m 6= n.
The probability pj of Alice measuring a particular generalized Bell state
|Φmj 〉 is
p1 = [f1(α, β)]
2, p2 = [f2(α, β)]
2, p3 = [f2(β, α)]
2, p4 = [f1(β, α)]
2, (92)
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where
f1(α, β) =
√
|α|2 +m2n2|β|2
(1 +m2)(1 + n2)
, f2(α, β) =
√
m2|α|2 + n2|β|2
(1 +m2)(1 + n2)
. (93)
After implementing her measurement, Alice tells Bob via a classical com-
munication channel the result she obtained. If she measured the state |Φmj 〉,
Bob’s state collapses to U †j |φj〉B, with |φj〉B given by Eqs. (94)-(97). To finish
the teleportation protocol, Bob uses the information received from Alice to
apply the corresponding unitary operation Uj on his qubit. Here U1 = 1 is
the identity matrix and U2 = σz , U3 = σx, and U4 = σzσx are given by the
standard Pauli matrices. After applying Uj his qubit is given by one of these
four possibilities,
|φ1〉B = α|0〉B +mnβ|1〉B√|α|2 +m2n2|β|2 , (94)
|φ2〉B = mα|0〉B + nβ|1〉B√
m2|α|2 + n2|β|2 , (95)
|φ3〉B = nα|0〉B +mβ|1〉B√
n2|α|2 +m2|β|2 , (96)
|φ4〉B = mnα|0〉B + β|1〉B√
m2n2|α|2 + |β|2 . (97)
In other words, if Alice obtained the state |Φmj 〉 after projecting her two qubits
onto the generalized Bell states, Bob’s qubit at the end of the teleportation
protocol is correspondingly described by the state |φj〉B. It is worth mentioning
that for m = n = 1 we get back to the original teleportation protocol [14],
where pj = 1/4 and |φj〉B = α|0〉B + β|1〉B for any j.
Looking at Eqs. (94)-(97), we realize that Bob gets a perfect replica of
Alice’s teleported qubit if she chooses m = n. This condition for the values of
m and n is often called the matching condition [16,18,19,22,23] and it is clear
that only two out of the four possible measurement results of Alice lead to a
perfect teleportation. This happens whenever she obtains either |Φm2 〉 or |Φm3 〉,
with m = n. In this scenario, |φ2〉B and |φ3〉B are given by α|0〉B + β|1〉B and
the teleportation protocol is considered successful. The probability of success
is
psuc(n) = p2 + p3 =
2n2
(1 + n2)2
. (98)
3.2 The GR10 protocol
Once the probabilistic teleportation protocol is understood, we are ready to
show how the GR10 protocol works. In what follows we will briefly review all
the steps in the execution of the GR10 protocol, similarly to the way Ref. [16]
originally introduced it.
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(i) Alice and Bob agree beforehand on two points. First, the encoding of the
classical bits will be made using only one orthonormal basis. This basis is
chosen such that its base vectors are non-orthogonal to the base vectors
used to express the partially entangled Bell states employed in the proba-
bilistic teleportation protocol. For instance, if the entangled resource shared
between Alice and Bob is given by |Φn1 〉AB = (|00〉AB+n|11〉AB)/
√
1 + n2,
they agree that the qubit |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 encodes the bit 0 and
|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 the bit 1. In other words, they use the x-basis to
encode the bits and the z-basis to write the Bell states.5 Second, they
also agree on the possible values of n. In the original version of the GR10
protocol, only two values for n are used, n1 and n2.
(ii) Alice randomly prepares a qubit in one of the two states described above,
namely, |+〉 or |−〉. Bob, in its turn, randomly generates either the partially
entangled two-qubit state |Φn11 〉AB or |Φn21 〉AB , sending one of the qubits
to Alice and keeping the other with him.
(iii) After receiving her share of the partially entangled state, Alice initiates the
probabilistic teleportation protocol as previously described. Specifically,
she projects the qubit encoding the classical bit and the qubit received
from Bob onto the generalized Bell state |Φmj 〉AA, where m is randomly
chosen between n1 or n2. Note that at this stage of the protocol, neither
Bob tells Alice the value of n he chose to prepare the entangled state nor
Alice tells Bob the value of m she chose in order to fix the generalized Bell
basis used to project her qubits. Alice only tells Bob the generalized Bell
state |Φmj 〉AA she got, j = 1, . . . , 4, but not the value of m.
(iv) After receiving the news from Alice (the value of j but not of m), Bob
implements the corresponding unitary operation to correct his qubit as
described in Sec. 3.1. His qubit, after that, is in one of the four possible
states listed in Eqs. (94)-(97), where α = |β| = 1/√2. He then projects his
qubit onto the x-basis. If his measurement result is |+〉, he assumes Alice
sent the bit 0, and if it yields the state |−〉, he assigns the bit value 1. This
whole process, steps (i) to (iv), is repeated N times.
(v) After Bob has finished all his measurements on the N qubits, Alice and
Bob, similarly to what is done in the BB84 protocol, start a conversation
over an authenticated public classical channel that can be fully insecure.
In this public discussion, they reveal to each other the following pieces of
information. He tells Alice the values of n (n1 or n2) he employed to prepare
each one of the partially entangled states and Alice tells him the values of
m (n1 or n2) used in each one of the N generalized Bell measurements she
made. They discard the instances in which m 6= n, keeping only the cases
where the matching condition occurred (m = n). About N/2 cases are
discarded and N/2 are kept. Of the remaining N/2 cases, another sifting
5 We can always use more than one orthonormal basis to encode the classical bits, with
non-orthogonal states encoding the same bit. If we use two such basis, we can see the present
protocol as an additional security layer to the BB84 protocol. But the whole point of the
GR10 protocol, which will be made clearer when we present its security analysis, is that it
is secure even if we use only one orthogonal basis to encode the classical bits.
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process is implemented. Due to the particular operation of the probabilistic
teleportation protocol, the teleported qubit reaching Bob is an exact replica
of Alice’s qubit if m = n and her measurement outcome is either |Φn2 〉
or |Φn3 〉. Therefore, they discard the cases in which Alice’s measurement
resulted in the states |Φn1 〉 and |Φn4 〉. The remaining bits are the raw key
which, after Eq. (98), is given by [16]
R =
(
psuc(n1)
2
+
psuc(n2)
2
)
N
2
. (99)
(vi) Finally, Alice and Bob disclose part of the bits of the raw key, which is used
to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. The publicly revealed informa-
tion is employed to estimate the error rate of the quantum communication
channel, allowing them to act accordingly to increase the security of the
shared key via classical reconciliation and privacy amplification protocols.
3.3 Security analysis of the GR10 protocol
The simplest way to qualitatively understand the security of the GR10 proto-
col is to push as far as possible the analogy between the GR10 and the BB84
protocols [16]. To do this, we first observe that in the GR10 protocol Alice and
Bob discard all the instances in which her generalized Bell measurements yield
|Φm1 〉 and |Φm4 〉. Of the remaining two possibilities, four different cases emerge.
Alice can either teleport the state |+〉 and obtain |Φm2 〉 for her Bell measure-
ment or she can teleport |+〉 and obtain |Φm3 〉. Similarly, she can choose to
teleport to Bob the state |−〉 and either obtain |Φm2 〉 or |Φm3 〉 after implement-
ing the generalized Bell measurement. The quantum states describing Bob’s
qubit for each one these four possibilities are respectively (see Eqs. (95) and
(96)), ∣∣∣0˜〉
B
=
m |0〉+ n |1〉√
n2 +m2
=
(m+ n) |+〉+ (m− n) |−〉√
2(n2 +m2)
, (100)
∣∣+˜〉
B
=
n |0〉+m |1〉√
n2 +m2
=
(m+ n) |+〉+ (n−m) |−〉√
2(n2 +m2)
, (101)
∣∣−˜〉
B
=
m |0〉 − n |1〉√
n2 +m2
=
(m− n) |+〉+ (m+ n) |−〉√
2(n2 +m2)
, (102)∣∣∣1˜〉
B
=
n |0〉 −m |1〉√
n2 +m2
=
(n−m) |+〉+ (m+ n) |−〉√
2(n2 +m2)
, (103)
where we have dropped the subindex B at the right hand side of the above
expressions for simplicity. It is not difficult to see that the set {|0˜〉B , |1˜〉B}
defines an orthonormal basis as well as the set {∣∣+˜〉
B
,
∣∣−˜〉
B
}. Let us call them
the z˜-basis and x˜-basis, respectively.
The analogy with the BB84 protocol is now clear. Whenever Alice teleports
the state |+〉, Bob randomly gets either the state |0˜〉 or ∣∣+˜〉, depending on
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which Bell measurement she obtained. If the matching condition is achieved
(n = m), we have that |0˜〉 =
∣∣+˜〉 = |+〉 and Bob will correctly assign the bit
value 0 after measuring his qubit in the x-basis. Similarly, if Alice teleports the
state |−〉, Bob’s qubit is either |1˜〉 or ∣∣−˜〉. For n = m we have |1˜〉 = ∣∣−˜〉 = |−〉
and Bob will get the correct bit value 1 after finishing his measurement in the
x-basis.
On the other hand, if the matching condition is not fulfilled (n 6= m),
the probability of Bob making a mistake is not zero and it is given by (m −
n)2/(2(n2 + m2)). Moreover, the fact that m 6= n breaks the degeneracy of
Bob’s possible states after the teleportation, i.e., |0˜〉 6= ∣∣+˜〉 and |1˜〉 6= ∣∣−˜〉.
This induces an encoding into non-orthogonal states for the bit values sent by
Alice, exactly as it happens in the BB84 protocol. Indeed, in this scenario the
bit value 0 is either associated with |0˜〉 or
∣∣+˜〉, where 〈0˜|+˜〉 = 2nm/(n2+m2),
and the bit value 1 is either related to |1˜〉 or
∣∣−˜〉, where again 〈1˜|−˜〉 = 〈0˜|+˜〉.
Putting it another way, although in the GR10 protocol we employ only
one set of orthonormal states to encode the key, the fact that its operation
is based on the probabilistic teleportation protocol leads to an effective non-
orthogonal encoding whenever m 6= n. And since Eve cannot always guess the
correct values of m and n in her eavesdropping before Alice and Bob finish all
their measurements, she will necessary be caught tampering with the execution
of the GR10 protocol.
Let us now move to the quantitative security analysis of the GR10 protocol.
First we note that, according to the discussion in the previous paragraphs,
whenever the matching condition is fulfilled (m = n) Bob gets an exact replica
of the teleported state. Thus, the entanglement-based representation of the
post-selected successful cases of the GR10 protocol is
|Φ˜1〉 = 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉). (104)
Equation (104) is the Bell state (13) written in the x-basis.
After Eve’s eavesdropping, a possible purification representing the state of
Alice, Bob, and Eve is
|Ψ〉ABE =
4∑
j=1
√
λj |Φ˜j〉AB|ǫj〉E , (105)
where |Φ˜1〉 was just defined and
|Φ˜2〉 = 1√
2
(|+ −〉+ | −+〉), (106)
|Φ˜3〉 = |01〉 , (107)
|Φ˜4〉 = |10〉 . (108)
Equation (106) is the standard Bell state (14) rewritten in the x-basis.
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The entanglement-based representation (105) is the one we employed when
we reassessed the security analysis of the BB84 protocol using a different pu-
rification, namely, Eq. (56). Here, however, we deal with the x-basis alone,
while in Sec. 2.5 both the z- and x-bases were possible preparation and mea-
surement basis for Alice and Bob. The fact that we now have no knowledge of
εz will reflect in one of the λ’s being undetermined. This forces us to carry out
the maximization of Eve’s accessible information over all possible strategies
that she might eventually use. When compared to the calculations of Sec. 2.5,
this will lead to a lower value for the error rate εx below which we have a
positive secret-key fraction and therefore security.
The states teleported by Alice are either |+〉 or |−〉. Since they are chosen
with equal chances, Alice’s ensemble of qubits are given by (|+〉〈+|+|−〉〈−|)/2
or, equivalently, by (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)/2. Hence, as in Sec. 2.5, we must have
pA(0) = pA(1) = 1/2, (109)
which leads to the constraint (68),
λ3 = λ4 = λ. (110)
Carrying out similar calculations to the ones detailed in Sec. 2, we get the
following expression for the mutual information between Alice and Bob,
I(A : B) = 1− h(εx). (111)
The error rate εx is the probability of Bob assigning the wrong bit value to
the bit teleported by Alice and is given by
εx = λ2 + λ = (1 + λ2 − λ1)/2, (112)
where we used the normalization condition
λ1 + λ2 + 2λ = 1 (113)
to arrive at the last equality.
By the same token we get
S(ρE) = −λ1 logλ1 − λ2 logλ2 − 2λ logλ, (114)
ρE|+ =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj |+
√
λ1λ3/2 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
+
√
λ1λ4/2 (|ǫ1〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.)−
√
λ2λ3/2 (|ǫ2〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
+
√
λ2λ4/2 (|ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) , (115)
ρE|− =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj | −
√
λ1λ3/2 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
−
√
λ1λ4/2 (|ǫ1〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) +
√
λ2λ3/2 (|ǫ2〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
−
√
λ2λ4/2 (|ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) . (116)
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The two non-null eigenvalues of either ρE|+ or ρE|− are (1 + λ1 − λ2)/2 =
1 − εx and (1 + λ2 − λ1)/2 = εx, where we used that λ3 = λ4 and Eq. (112)
to write the eigenvalues as shown. We thus get
S(ρE|+) = S(ρE|−) = h(εx) (117)
and with the aid of Eq. (114) we can write the Holevo quantity as follows,
χ(A : E) = −λ1 logλ1 − λ2 logλ2 − 2λ logλ− h(εx). (118)
Finally, the secret-key fraction (1) becomes
r = 1 +min
Eve
{λ1 logλ1 + λ2 logλ2 + 2λ logλ}
= 1 +min
λ
{(1− εx − λ) log(1− εx − λ) + (εx − λ) log(εx − λ) + 2λ logλ} .
(119)
To obtain the last equality we used Eqs. (112) and (113) to express λ1 and λ2
in terms of εx and λ,
λ1 = 1− εx − λ, λ2 = εx − λ. (120)
Solving
dr
dλ
= 0 (121)
for λ we get
λmin = εx(1− εx) (122)
and that
d2r(λmin)
dλ2
> 0, (123)
proving that we indeed have found the minimum of r(λ).
Inserting Eq. (122) into (119) we obtain the following lower bound for the
secret-key fraction of the GR10 protocol,
r = 1− 2h(εx). (124)
Searching for the root of Eq. (124) we get that r > 0 if
εx . 11%. (125)
In other words, for error rates less than 11% the GR10 protocol operates
securely. In Fig. 1 we show Eq. (124) as a function of εx.
Similarly to what we did when presenting the alternative security proof
of the BB84 protocol, we have worked out the security analysis for the GR10
protocol without imposing constraint (68). Again, we obtained Eq. (68) at the
end of the minimization process as the optimal scenario for Eve.
Moreover, the purification (105) is crucial to attain a tight lower bound for
the secret-key fraction r. Had we worked with the purification (18), as usually
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Fig. 1 Lower bound of the secret-key fraction r as a function of εx for the GR10 protocol
(Eq. (124)). The quantity εx is the error rate for Bob’s measurements in the x-basis. Here
and in all graphics all quantities are dimensionless.
done in the security analysis of the BB84 protocol, we would get a too strong
lower bound, one that yields r < 0 for any value of εx > 0.
Finally, it is important to note that the security analysis presented here
and in the next section can be directly extended to coherent attacks, leading to
the unconditional security of the GR10 protocol and its modified version given
in Sec. 4. This is true due to the works of Renner [38] and Renner and Cirac
[39], built on the previous works of Refs. [36,37]. The key result of Ref. [38]
was the proof that in the asymptotic limit security against collective attacks
are essentially equivalent to security against coherent ones.
4 Modifications to the GR10 protocol and their security analysis
We now modify the operation of the GR10 protocol in the following sense.
Originally, as given in Ref. [16], all instances in which Alice’s measurement
results yielded the generalized Bell states |Φm1 〉 and |Φm4 〉 were discarded as
well as the cases where the matching condition did not occur (m 6= n). We
now want to consider a protocol where all cases are included as a valid outcome.
In this way we increase the size of the raw key R at the cost of decreasing the
value of the secret-key fraction r. Whether the secret key’s size K = rR will
be greater in one or the other way of implementing the GR10 protocol will
depend of the value of the error rate and on the values of n1 and n2 adopted
in its operation.
When we consider all instances, i.e., all Alice’s possible measurement out-
comes and whether or not n = m, Bob will inevitably fail sometimes in the
correct identification of the bit value teleported by Alice, even in the
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case. Therefore, the entanglement-based representation of the modified GR10
protocol will inherit this property and it is given by
|ξ1〉 =
√
pAB(+,+)|++〉+
√
pAB(−,−)| − −〉
+
√
pAB(+,−)|+−〉+
√
pAB(−,+)| −+〉.
(126)
Here pAB(+,+) + pAB(−,−) is the probability of Alice and Bob obtaining a
perfect correlation between their bit values and pAB(+,−)+ pAB(−,+) is the
probability of they disagreeing about those values.
According to the functioning of the probabilistic teleportation protocol, a
direct calculation gives
pAB(+,+) = pAB(−,−) = p, (127)
pAB(+,−) = pAB(−,+) = 1/2− p, (128)
where
p =
1
4
+
(n1 + n2)
2(1 + n1n2)
2
4(1 + n21)
2(1 + n22)
2
. (129)
It is worth noting that p is symmetric if we change the value of n1 with that of
n2. Moreover, p is a monotonically increasing function of either n1 or n2 and
whenever n1 6= 0 or n2 6= 0, p > 1/4. Also, for n1 = n2 = 1 we have p = 1/2.
Since we must have some entanglement shared between Alice and Bob in the
operation of the GR10 protocol, in what follows 1/4 < p ≤ 1/2.6
Thus, using Eqs. (127) and (128) the entanglement-based representation
(126) becomes
|ξ1〉=√p(|++〉+ | − −〉) +
√
1/2− p(|+−〉+ | −+〉)
=
√
2p|Φ1〉+
√
1− 2p|Φ2〉, (130)
where |Φ1〉 and |Φ2〉 are the Bell states (13) and (14). Note that we have
suppressed for simplicity the subscripts AB when writing the above kets.
6 Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that if in the BB84 protocol we accept all instances as
a valid outcome, even when Alice and Bob use different preparation and measurement basis,
we get an error rate of 25% in the ideal case (no Eve or noise). When the matching condition
is not satisfied, the outcomes of Bob’s measurements are completely uncorrelated to the bit
values encoded by Alice in the qubits sent to him. On the other hand, the modified GR10
protocol’s ideal error rate, 1−2p, depends on the entanglement of the quantum states shared
between Alice and Bob (the values of n1 and n2, cf. Eq. (129)). As such, for the modified
GR10 protocol we can tune this error rate as we wish and whenever p ≥ 3/8 ≈ 0.375 the error
rate 1−2p is lower than 25%, approaching zero as n1 and n2 tend to one. Furthermore, due
to the GR10 protocol’s teleportation based operation, Bob’s measurement outcomes are not
completely independent of Alice’s teleported qubits, including the instances in which Alice
and Bob assign different bit values at a given run of the protocol. It is this entanglement-
dependent ubiquitous correlation that allows the modified GR10 protocol to operate securely
for not too low levels of entanglement.
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The state describing Alice, Bob, and Eve after Eve tampered with the key
transmission can be represented by the following purification,
|Ψ〉ABE =
4∑
j=1
√
λj |ξj〉AB|ǫj〉E . (131)
Here |ξ1〉 is given by Eq. (130) and
|ξ2〉 =
√
2p|Φ2〉 −
√
1− 2p|Φ1〉, (132)
|ξ3〉 = |Φ3〉 , (133)
|ξ4〉 = |Φ4〉 , (134)
where |Φ3〉 and |Φ4〉 are the Bell states (15) and (16).
As before, this particular way of writing the purification is crucial in our
quest for a tight lower bound for the secret-key fraction r. This is true since
we will get an additional constraint on the possible values of the λ’s due to
the specific operation of the GR10 protocol. This constraint is obtained noting
that since Alice always teleports with equal chances the states |+〉 or |−〉, we
must necessarily have,
pA(0) = pA(1) = 1/2. (135)
Note that pA(+) = pA(−) = 1/2 is trivially satisfied.
A direct calculation gives
pA(0) = 1/2 + (λ1 − λ2)
√
2p(1− 2p), (136)
pA(1) = 1/2− (λ1 − λ2)
√
2p(1− 2p), (137)
and Eq. (135) is satisfied for p 6= 1/2 if, and only if,
λ1 = λ2 = λ. (138)
For p = 1/2 this restriction is not needed since we automatically have pA(0) =
pA(1) = 1/2. However, employing arguments of continuity for the value of the
secret-key fraction as a function of p we can set λ1 = λ2 for the whole range
of p without getting into any physical or mathematical inconsistency.7
Before we proceed it is important to define in the present context what
we mean by the “error” made by Bob when measuring his qubits due to the
presence of Eve. Since now even without Eve it is possible that Bob gets the
wrong bit value sent by Alice, it is more appropriate to talk about “deviation”
from the expected results in the ideal case (no Eve). Therefore, we define the
deviation δx as follows,
δx=pAB(+,−) + pAB(−,+)− p0AB(+,−)− p0AB(−,+), (139)
7 We have also employed a different entanglement-based representation designed to handle
the p = 1/2 case alone. The secret-key fraction we obtained was the same as the one we
got for p = 1/2 using the present entanglement-based representation with the constraint
λ1 = λ2.
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where p0AB(a, b) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob obtaining, respec-
tively, the values a and b when Eve does not interfere. Note that p0AB(+,−)+
p0AB(−,+) is the probability of Alice and Bob disagreeing about the bit values
in the absence of Eve while pAB(+,−) + pAB(−,+) is the probability of they
disagreeing when Eve is present.
We also define the relative deviation of agreement as follows,
∆x =
p0AB(+,+) + p
0
AB(−,−)− pAB(+,+)− pAB(−,−)
p0AB(+,+) + p
0
AB(−,−)
,
=
δx
p0AB(+,+) + p
0
AB(−,−)
, (140)
where the last equality comes from the fact that
∑
a,b pAB(a, b) = 1 and from
Eq. (139). Note that δx = ∆x = εx whenever the probability of making a
mistake in the ideal scenario is zero, as it happens in the BB84 and in the
original GR10 protocols (cf. Eq. (19)).
Carrying out the calculations of the joint probabilities we get for Eqs. (139)
and (140),
δx = λ+ λ4 − 1 + 2p, (141)
∆x = δx/(2p). (142)
Using Eqs. (138) and (141), together with the normalization condition
∑4
j=1 λj
= 1, we can express the four λ’s as follows,
λ1 = λ2 = λ, (143)
λ3 = 2p− δx − λ = λ+ − λ, (144)
λ4 = 1− 2p+ δx − λ = λ− − λ. (145)
This allows us to write the mutual information between Alice and Bob as
I(A : B) = 1− h(2p− δx). (146)
The relevant quantities needed to the calculation of the Holevo quantity are
obtained in the same fashion already discussed for the BB84 and the original
GR10 protocols:
S(ρE) = −2λ logλ− λ3 logλ3 − λ4 log λ4, (147)
ρE|+ =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj |+
√
2pλ1λ3 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
−
√
(1− 2p)λ1λ4 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ4|+ h.c.)−
√
(1 − 2p)λ2λ3 (|ǫ2〉EE〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
−
√
2pλ2λ4 (|ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) , (148)
ρE|− =
4∑
j=1
λj |ǫj〉EE 〈ǫj | −
√
2pλ1λ3 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
+
√
(1− 2p)λ1λ4 (|ǫ1〉EE 〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) +
√
(1 − 2p)λ2λ3 (|ǫ2〉EE〈ǫ3|+ h.c.)
+
√
2pλ2λ4 (|ǫ2〉E E〈ǫ4|+ h.c.) . (149)
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The eigenvalues of ρE|+ and ρE|− are the same. The non-zero ones can be
written as λ+ and λ− if we use Eqs. (143)-(145). This allows us to write
S(ρE|+) = S(ρE|−) = h(λ+) = h(2p− δx). (150)
The Holevo quantity then becomes
χ(A : E) = −2λ logλ− (λ+ − λ) log(λ+ − λ)− (λ− − λ) log(λ− − λ)− h(λ+),
(151)
leading to the following secret-key fraction
r = 1+min
Eve
{2λ logλ+ (λ+ − λ) log(λ+ − λ) + (λ− − λ) log(λ− − λ)} . (152)
Remembering that
λ+ = 2p− δx, λ− = 1− 2p+ δx, (153)
we can solve
dr
dλ
= 0 (154)
for λ and get
λmin = λ+λ− = (2p− δx)(1 − 2p+ δx). (155)
A direct calculation shows that
d2r(λmin)
dλ2
> 0, (156)
which proves that we got the minimum value of r(λ).
Therefore, using Eqs. (153) and (155), we can write the lower bound for
the secret-key fraction (152) as follows,
r = 1− 2h(λ+) = 1− 2h(2p− δx) = 1− 2h[2p(1−∆x)], (157)
where the last equality is obtained using Eq. (142).
In the main panel of Fig. 2 we show r as a function of ∆x for several values
of p. We see that the greater the value of p the greater r and thus the greater
the secret-key fraction for a given value of ∆x. For values of p close to its
maximal value 1/2 we can guarantee security for the modified GR10 protocol
for a deviation rate as great as 11%. As we start decreasing p, which is related
to less entanglement shared between Alice and Bob, we no longer have r > 0
whenever p . 0.45. In other words, whenever the level of entanglement shared
between Alice and Bob is such that p < 0.45, we can only achieve security using
the original GR10 protocol, which works for any value of p > 1/4 (n1 6= 0 and
n2 6= 0). However, the price to pay as we decrease p in the original GR10
protocol is the corresponding reduction of the size of the raw key R.
In the inset of Fig. 2 we show how the lower bound to the secret-key
fraction responds to a reconciliation protocol (classical error correction step)
whose efficiency is not optimal. We model a non-ideal reconciliation protocol
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by including an effective reduction of the mutual information between Alice
and Bob in the expression for r [5,6,7]. In this scenario it changes to
r = βI(A : B)−max
Eve
χ(A : E), (158)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Repeating all the steps of the previous calculation when we
had β = 1, we get for the lower bound of the secret-key fraction,
r = β[1− h(λ+)]− h(λ+). (159)
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Fig. 2 Main panel: Lower bound of r, the secret-key fraction for the modified GR10 pro-
tocol as given by Eq. (157), as a function of ∆x, the relative deviation from the expected
probability of Alice and Bob getting the same bit values with and without the presence of
Eve. Inset: The same as in the main panel but now assuming a reconciliation efficiency of
β = 0.8.
For discrete variable quantum key distribution schemes, the reconciliation
protocols have β ≈ 1. In any case, we have tested how the modified GR10
protocol responds to a reconciliation protocol with β = 0.8, a very conservative
value. As we can see in the inset of Fig. 2, it still keeps working securely for
p ≥ 0.46 when we have deviation rates ∆x lower or equal to 1% while for
p = 0.49 we have security for ∆x . 7%.
It is worth mentioning that the lower bound for the secret-key fraction
computed above implies that the modified GR10 protocol works for n1 = n2
and, in particular, for n1 = n2 = 1. The latter case corresponds to using the
standard and deterministic probabilistic teleportation protocol to establish a
secret-key between Alice and Bob, where Alice teleports only the states |+〉
and |−〉. In other words, this means that by using the teleportation protocol
as originally presented [14], we can establish a secret key between Alice and
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Bob employing only orthogonal states to encode be bit values teleported from
Alice to Bob. There is no need to use non-orthogonal states as in the BB84 or
B92 protocols [4,11].
This “counterintuitive” behavior is readily understood by noting that the
teleportation protocol has a built-in probabilistic aspect that cannot be over-
come by any “superpowerful” quantum Eve. Indeed, if quantum mechanics is
the correct description of nature, no one, not even Eve, has control over what
will be the Bell state measured by Alice. This inherently probabilistic aspect
of the quantum teleportation protocol precludes Eve from tampering with the
teleportation protocol without being detected by Alice and Bob. This is so
because the unitary operations that Bob needs to implement on his qubits at
the end of the protocol are dictated by what Alice informs him of the results
of her Bell state measurements and by the entangled resource shared between
them. In this way, if Eve probes too deep trying to figure out the state tele-
ported to Bob, she will cause changes to the Bell state shared between Alice
and Bob. As such, the correct unitary operation that Bob must implement
to correct his qubit will change too. Bob, being unaware of this change, will
implement the unitary operation associated with the original Bell state shared
with Alice. The use of the wrong unitary operation will make Bob assign the
wrong value for the bit teleported from Alice and will lead to Alice and Bob
detecting the presence of Eve when they compare the bit values of a sample
of the shared string of bits. Mathematically, this intuitive fact will eventually
reflect itself in a positive secret-key rate r even when n1 = n2.
8
We also point to two other ways in which we can modify the GR10 protocol.
The first one corresponds to increasing the number of quantum states employed
to encode the bits teleported from Alice to Bob. We can, similarly to the
BB84 protocol, use the states |0〉 and |1〉 together with the states |+〉 and |−〉
to encode the bit values. In this case we will be using non-orthogonal states
to encode the bits and we can think of the GR10 protocol as an additional
layer of security to the BB84 protocol. Second, we can choose to work with
different post-selected subensembles. For example, instead of considering all
runs of the teleportation protocol as we did above, we can select only the cases
in which Bob sent the partially entangled state with n = n1, discarding the
n = n2 cases. Or we can work with the cases in which Alice implemented the
generalized Bell measurements with m = n1, discarding the m = n2 cases.
This will reduce the size of the raw key R, but if n1 > n2 we can show that by
working with these subsets we can get a positive secret-key fraction (security)
8 We can also intuitively understand the security of the GR10 protocol noting that the
states prepared by Alice are not sent from her to Bob, they are teleported, which prevents
Eve from having a direct access to those states. This is a key difference from the BB84
protocol, where the states encoding the bits are directly sent to Bob. The teleportation of
orthogonal states, instead of their direct transmission, together with the inherent random
aspect of the measuring results of Alice during the implementation of the teleportation
protocol forbid the undetected cloning of those states by Eve.
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for a wider range of the deviation ∆x when compared to the case where all
runs of the teleportation protocol is accepted as a valid outcome.9
We end this section by noting that the main technical challenge in the
practical implementation of the original or of the modified GR10 protocols
is the ability to generate entangled states. Entanglement is the main ingredi-
ent needed to implement the teleportation protocol, which is a key building
block in the execution of all GR10-like protocols. The BB84-like protocols
do not need entangled states to operate. However, once Alice and Bob share
an entangled state, and it does not need to be a maximally entangled one,
they can execute the GR10 protocol no matter how far away they are. This
opens the possibility of increasing the distance in which a quantum key distri-
bution scheme works securely, going beyond the maximum distance that any
BB84-like protocol can reach.
5 Conclusion
In this work we presented a rigorous security proof for the GR10 quantum key
distribution protocol, whose operation is based on the probabilistic teleporta-
tion protocol and on the use of only orthogonal quantum states to encode the
bits of the secret key [16]. Being more specific, we have carried out the asymp-
totic security analysis of the GR10 protocol against all types of individual and
collective attacks, determining the error rates below which we guarantee a se-
cure operation of the key distribution scheme. Moreover, applying the results
of Refs. [36,37,38,39] we argued that the present security analysis is easily ex-
tended to coherent attacks, leading to the unconditional security of the GR10
protocol.
Furthermore, we revisited the security analysis of the BB84 protocol [4] by
exploring the non-uniqueness of the Schmidt decomposition (purification) that
describes the quantum state of Alice, Bob, and the eavesdropper Eve after the
latter has tampered with the key transmission. This allowed us to show that
the BB84 protocol is secure for greater values of error rates than the standard
security analysis predicted [6]. This non-uniqueness of the purification was
the key ingredient allowing us to obtain tight lower bounds for the secret-key
fraction of the GR10 protocol and its modified version.
We also showed a modified version of the GR10 protocol that operates de-
terministically, providing its full security analysis. We showed that this version
of the GR10 protocol is still secure even if we use only orthogonal states to
encode the bit values teleported from Alice to Bob. We showed that the price
to pay when going from the probabilistic to the deterministic protocol is a
reduction of the value of the secret-key fraction, specially when the degree of
entanglement shared between Alice and Bob is small.
9 The entanglement-based representation and all the calculations leading to the secret-key
fraction r when we deal with these subensembles are equal to the ones shown in Sec. 4. The
only change is in the value of p, Eq. (129). It still depends on n1 and n2 but has a different
functional form.
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Finally, we would like to point out two possible extensions of the ideas
here presented that we believe is worthy of investigation. First, it would be
interesting to study how to devise a GR10-like protocol that operates with
qudits instead of qubits. The main quest here is to obtain a scenario where
working with qudits leads to an increase of the error rate below which the
protocol is secure. The second extension is a bit more difficult and it lies in
how to reshape the GR10 protocol in order to make it work with continuous
variable systems.
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